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Violence in Professional Sports: A
Proposal for Self-Regulation
By DON EUGENE-NOLAN GIBsoN*

Introduction
The trial of professional hockey player Dave Forbes on aggravated assault charges focused public and legal attention on the issue of violence in professional sports.' Much of the current concern
about the level of violence2 in professional sports exists because:
(1) professional athletes often serve as role models for children;
(2) violence in sports may have adverse effects on other parts of
society;" and (3) there has been an alarming increase in the number of injuries suffered by professional athletes.'
* Member, Second Year Class, U.C.L.A. School of Law.
1. Hallowell & Meshbesher, Sports Violence and the Criminal Law, 13 TRIAL 27 (Jan.
1977). Forbes was indicted because of an altercation with Henry Boucha during a hockey
game between the Boston Bruins and the Minnesota North Stars on January 4, 1975.
Forbes, [playing for the Bruins], apparently checked Boucha against the boards,
with his elbows up, and Boucha retaliated by punching Forbes who fell to the ice.
Both players were sent off the ice [with] penalties. . . . When they returned to
the ice, Boucha was skating ahead of Forbes who allegedly . .. took a swing at
Boucha. Although missing with his gloved hand, Forbes did strike Boucha with
the butt end of his stick, and after Boucha fell to the ice covering his seriously
injured face, Forbes jumped on Boucha punching him until the two were separated by a third player. Approximately 25 stitches were used to close the stickinflicted cut next to Boucha's right eye. Double vision prompted x-rays and the
need for surgery to repair a small fracture in the floor of the right eye socket.
R. HORRow, SPORTs VIOLENCE: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW MAKING AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 162 (1980). The case was subsequently dismissed because of a hung jury.
State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., dismissed Aug. 12, 1975).
2. See notes 22-24 & accompanying text infra.
3. See Sprotzer, Violence in ProfessionalSports: A Need for FederalRegulation, 86 CASE
& COMMENT 3, 8 (May/June 1981). The concern is that violence by professional athletes will
foster violent attitudes in children. Id. See also R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 114-18.
4. Many commentators feel that if violence in sports is condoned, violence will increase in
other parts of society. See, e.g., R. HoRROw, supra note 1, at 116-17; Note, Sports Violence:
A Matter of Societal Concern, 55 NOTRE DAm LAW. 796 (1980).
5. See generally Sprotzer supra note 3, at 3; Note, Liability in ProfessionalSports: An
Alternative to Violence? 22 ARIz. L. REV. 919 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Liability in
Professional Sports]. For example, during "the 1974-75 hockey season, there were over
44,000 treatments for hockey injuries in U.S. hospital emergency rooms." R. HoRRow, supra
425
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Violence in professional sports is a most controversial issue." One
commentator asserts that if these acts "were committed off the
athletic field the perpetrator of the violent act in question would
most probably be prosecuted by local authorities and the result
would be a jail sentence." 7 Similarly, some commentators feel that
"[t]he . . . act of putting on a uniform and entering the sports

arena should not serve as a license to engage in behavior which
would constitute a crime if committed elsewhere." They view the
imposition of criminal and civil" sanctions as the most effective
means of deterrence and control."
Criminal law enforcement authorities have had limited involvement with the professional sports violence issue" and, until recently, very few professional athletes sought judicial remedies for
injuries they received during the course of play." The area of the
law involving violence in organized sports is new and
controversial."
This Note discusses violence in professional sports" that are
subject to private regulation." The Note argues that the applicanote 1, at 5. Also, during the same year, there was an average of 12 injuries for every 10
players in the NFL. Id at 8. But see Ranii, Sports Violence Lawsuits Erupt, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 9, 1981, at 30, cols. 3 & 4 (Edward Garvey, Executive Director of the National Football
League Players Association, told a congressional committee: "the overwhelming preponderance of sports injuries occur in the absence of negligent, reckless or intentional conduct;"
and quoting Robert C. Berry, a professor at Boston College Law School and head of an
American Bar Association committee on sports, "[tihere may have been an increase in injuries-but that is not because of excessive force. Players today are bigger, faster and
stronger. When their bodies collide, injuries result.") The National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) contends that the use of the synthetic playing surface is a major reason for the increase in injuries to players in the NFL. See Sports Violence: Hearings on H.
R. 7903 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Committee on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of Edward R. Garvey, Executive Director, NFLPA) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H. R. 7903]. Please note that these hearings are unpublished; a
copy is on file at ComM/ENT L.J. office.

6. See Sprotzer, supra note 3, at 3.
7. Id.
8. Flakne & Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, 13 TRIAL 33, 35 (Jan. 1977).
9. See notes 97-145 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 146-76 and accompanying text infra.
11. See, e.g., Note, Liability in Professional Sports, supra note 5.
12. See notes 100-02 and accompanying text infra.
13. See Comment, On Finding Civil Liability Between Professional Football Players:
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 741, 750 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Civil Liability Between Professional Football Players].
14. See People v. Freer, 86 Misc. 2d 280 (1976).
15. Inclusion of amateur sports would make this Note unmanageable.
16. Boxing is excluded as it is subject to state athletic commission regulation. See, e.g.,
ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-221-237 (1974); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 18600-18783 (West

No. 3]1

VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

427

tion of criminal and civil sanctions is not the most feasible means
of deterring and controlling violence in professional sports.", Part I
discusses the scope of the sports violence problem;' 8 Part II discusses and analyzes the various methods of deterrence and control
that have been attempted and recommended."9 Finally, after demonstrating that these methods are inherently flawed and limited,
this Note proposes self-regulation as the best method of deterring
and controlling professional sports violence.2 0 Nevertheless, reform
of the present system of league discipline is necessary for self-regulation to be effective."

I.
The Scope of the Sports Violence Problem
Before one begins analyzing professional sports violence, one
must define violence in the professional sports context. Because violence has many definitions," determining its scope in professional
athletic competition is difficult."8 Violence, when referred to in this
Note, will involve those acts that are excessively rough and unnecessary; essentially beyond that amount of roughness which is commensurate with the physical nature of a particular sport.
Violence in sports is not a new phenomenon; "[e]arlier in this
century, sports were characterized by violence, extreme injury,
public indignation and official reform action."'5 American society
has expressed, and still expresses, much concern about the level of
1964); N. Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS

§§ 8901-8933 (McKinney 1974).

17. See notes 123-45, 177-83 & accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 22-62 & accompanying text infra.

19. See notes 69-183 & accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 184-92 & accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 194-208 & accompanying text infra.
22. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary lists eleven different definitions.
23. For example, John A. Ziegler, Jr., President of the National Hockey League stated
that "there is violence in the NHL when violence is defined as 'intense turbulent furious
action,' or 'furious,' or a 'clashing or jarring quality,' but discounted the existence of violence
in the league 'when violence is defined as 'exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse.'
Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of John A. Ziegler, Jr., President,
National Hockey League.).
24. See SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R.
REP. No. 1786, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss. 121 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 HousE REPORT].

25. Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 1, at 27; In 1905, President Teddy Roosevelt
threatened to abolish football by executive order unless the game was made less violent. R.
HORROw, supra note 1, at 7. In 1920 Cleveland Indian Ray Chapman was killed when he was
hit by a fastball thrown by Yankee pitcher Carl Mays. See Doing Violence to Sport, TIME,
May 31, 1976, at 64.
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violence in sports."
Although most sports experience some amount of excessively
rough or violent acts," the contact sports are most often cited as
the real problem areas."' Because the contact sports are inherently
rough, the occurrence of excessively rough and violent acts "make
them appear almost war-like or brutal."" This type of behavior
has become an acceptable element of conduct during play and also
gains approval from coaches, respect from fellow players, and endorsement from spectators. 0

A. Hockey
Hockey has received much notoriety because of the amount of
player violence" witnessed at almost every game, and because of
some highly publicized criminal proceedings. Several players have
been arrested, arraigned,8 and indicted 8 for acts committed while
26. See notes 2-5 & accompanying text supra.
27. "[I]t . .. appear[s] that a majority of American society has chosen to accept a certain
amount of violence as part of professional sports." Sprotzer, supra note 3, at 4.
28. The contact sports are usually considered hockey and football. Although basketball
and baseball are essentially non-contact sports, they, nevertheless, have the potential for
extreme violence. They are therefore included in this Note's discussion of professional
sports violence.
29. 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 121.
30. JudicialScrutiny of Tortious Conduct in ProfessionalSports: Do Professional Athletes Assume the Risk of Injuries Resulting from Rule Violations? 17 CALiF. W. L. REV. 149,
150 (1980).

31. Although this Note addresses the problem of player violence, fan violence is also of
great public concern. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 126-30. Several members of
the Boston Bruins were fined and suspended because of a post-game brawl with fans at New
York's Madison Square Garden in 1980. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1980, § A, at 19, col. 1.
Because of this incident, several fans filed a $7 million personal injury and civil rights suit
against the players involved, both teams, the NHL, Madison Square Garden, and the City of
New York. The suit was dismissed on Jan. 19, 1981 for jurisdictional reasons. See 3 SPORTS
L. REP. 2 (Jan. 1981). Recently, Cesar Cedeno of the Houston Astros was fined $5,000.00 for
going into the stands after a fan who taunted him and his wife. See L. A. Times, Sept. 12,
1981, pt. III, at 4, col. 1. After studying this problem, a Congressional Committee concluded
that fan violence could be reduced, if not eliminated, by controlling the level of player violence. 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 128.
32. In 1976, Canadian authorities in Toronto arraigned Don Saleski, Mel Bridgman, and
Joe Watson of the NHL's Philadelphia Flyers on charges of assault and carrying offensive
weapons. The charges stemmed from several fights that occured during a playoff game. See
Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425, 426 n.3 (1976-77).
The charges against Saleski and Bridgman were dropped, and Watson pleaded guilty to one
count of simple assault and was fined $1,000.00. See Note, Torts in Sports-Deterring Violence in ProfessionalAthletics, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 764, 771 n.55 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Torts in Sports].
33. See note 1 supra. Wayne Maki and Ted Green were both tried for assaulting each
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playing; fighting between players, both on and off the ice," is prevalent in the National Hockey League (NHL). Commentators contend that rather than taking steps to eliminate fights between
players, 5 NHL officials condone and promote fighting." They view
fighting as a necessary outlet and "a far more acceptable alternative to the harmful use of sticks as a means to vent frustrations.""
Management deems violence to be acceptable when "two players
... fight as a spontaneous reaction to pressure which builds up
when bodies are hurtling into each other at thirty miles per
hour. . . ."38 An alternative reason for the NHL's approval of

fighting is the fact that the spectacle created on ice, in most cases,
increases a team's ability to bring fans into the arena."
In addition, internal pressures40 faced by athletes promote and
other. The incident occurred during an exhibition game between the Boston Bruins and the
St. Louis Blues. Green, playing for the Bruins, got into a skirmish with Maki behind the
goal where Green either struck, or pushed Maki in the face with his glove. They then came
off the boards with their sticks raised high. Maki allegedly struck Green in the abdomen
with his stick at which point they came together with Green swinging at Maki, striking him
either on the neck or shoulders. Maki then swung back at Green, striking him in the head
and causing injuries. Maki was charged with assault causing bodily harm; Regina v. Maki, 14
D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970). Green was charged with common assault; Regina v.
Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970). One year after the Forbes trial, Dan Maloney
of the Detroit Red Wings severely beat Brian Glennie of the Toronto Maple Leafs during a
hockey game. He was then tried on a charge of assault causing bodily harm, but was acquitted. Regina v. Maloney, 28 C.C.C.2d 323 (Ont. Co. Ct. 1976).
34. Seven seconds into a game between the Boston Bruins and the Minnesota North
Stars, a brawl broke out and was followed by a dozen other fights. One of these spilled onto
the runway leading to the Minnesota locker room. These incidents produced an NHL record
of 406 penalty minutes and caused the ejection of 12 players. See Kirshenbaum, It's Time
for the NHL to Stop the Hooliganism, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 9, 1981, at 9.
35. The only major action taken by the NHL's Board of Governors recently was the institution of Rule 54(e) which is aimed at preventing secondary fights. It provides penalties for
players, other than the original combatants, who drop sticks, gloves, etc. in preparing to
fight. See Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 8 (statement of John A. Ziegler, Jr.).
36. See e.g., Kirshenbaum, note 34 supra; note 96 infra. "The premium the NHL puts on
fighting was reestablished every time I talked to a team on behalf of a draft choice. Invariably, the interview would get around to how well my client could fight. . . . To my endless
amazement, the clubs,-if they got the impression the boy wasn't tough enough-frequently
offered to enroll him in boxing classes." Sprotzer, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting sports agent
Bob Woolf).
37. Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of John A. Ziegler, Jr.).
38. Id. at 8.
39. The Philadelphia Flyers have been the NHL's most belligerent team. They have led
the league in penalty minutes for nine straight years, and have been called the league's
"best draw" by League President John Ziegler, Jr. Ziegler added that "[ijf the other 20
teams were as successful, [he would] be pleased, regardless of how they achieved such success." Kirshenbaum, note 34, supra.
40. These are pressures placed on the player by his peers, coaches, management, and the
rule structure itself, to conform to accepted behavior. For a full treatment of these concepts
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encourage fighting among them.41 Less talented players must often
use excessive force and be overly aggressive to compensate for their
inferior athletic ability." Also, players feel compelled either to
fight when challenged or risk being branded as cowards by their
peers and the spectators.48 Further compounding the problem is
the notion that in hockey certain player types are needed because
the role they play is an integral part of the game strategy." Among
these player types are "enforcers" whose primary purpose is intimidating opposing players and/or instigating fights." In essence,
then, hockey players fight because "it has become a condition or
part of the job." 6

B. Football
Football, like hockey, draws attention because of its violent nature. In professional football, the main attribute that coaches look
for in a prospective player is aggressiveness.' 1 Because violent
physical contact is an integral part of the game, a player's ability
to absorb punishment is as important as his ability to mete it
out.' 8 Further, professional football players are conditioned to play
with pain because they are expected to perform while hurt.49 Consequently, the professional football player has an average career
length of only 4.6 years" and a life expectancy that is "significantly shorter than that of most males."51
see R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 30-38. Also, players are constantly reminded that there are
thousands of players in the minor leagues and colleges available to replace a player who is
"not tough enough." 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 123 (citing P. Hocu, Rip OFF
THE BIG GAME: THE EXPLOITATION OF SPORTS BY THE POWER ELITE).
41. R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 20.
42. Id. at 20-24.
43. Id. at 30. Former NHL President Clarence Campbell admitted that there is duress
and pressure placed on players to stand their ground and fight. See Hechter, supra note 32,
at 438 n.13.

44. "I'm more valuable in the penalty box than I am sitting on the bench . .. I'm not
gonna stop fighting even if I could. It's one of my assets and if it helps win games I'm going
to keep fighting." R. HORROW, Supra note 1, at 23 (quoting Dave Schultz, formerly of the
Philadelphia Flyers) (emphasis added). See also 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 24, at 122.
45. R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 21.
46. B. WOOLF, BEHIND CLOSED Doos 144 (1976).
47. Id. at 16 (citing 12 GA. L. REv. 380, 388 (1978).
48. See Furlong, Football Violence, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 122.
49. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd,
601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
50. R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 9, citing Schmidt, In Football,Its Arbitration, 14 TRIAL
38, 44 (1978).
51. Id. citing J. Capetta, The "Booby" Trap: Does the Violent Nature of Professional
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Football, like hockey, receives severe criticism from both players
and observers because of the prevalence of acts that serve to make
the game's already violent nature even more violent.52 Physical intimidation of opposing players is now essential to the game strategy." As a result, one player has been crippled," and many others
seriously, though not permanently, injured.55 Not surprisingly,
many of the game's participants have openly voiced their concern
about the direction in which the game is evolving." One player, in
fact, filed suit against the opposing team for injuries caused by one
of its players during a game.5

C. Basketball
Basketball is essentially a "noncontact" sport and excessive violence is not as widespread as it is in football and hockey. The most
notable incident was the fight between Rudy Tomjanovich and
Kermit Washington which occurred in 1977."' Tomjanovich, the inFootball Vitiate the Doctrine of Due Care in ParticipantTort Litigation? 10 CONN. L. REV.
372 (1978).
52. "Extracurricular violence is increasing and nothing is being done about it." 12 GA. L.
REV. 380, 390 n.51 (1978) (quoting Lynn Swann of the Pittsburg Steelers). See also Balzer,
Pro Football Focus, THE SPORTING NEWS, Oct. 17, 1981, at 38; THE SPORTING NEws, Nov. 21,
1981, at 6, col. 1.
53. R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 17. See generally J. TATUM, THEY CALL ME ASSASSIN
(1979).
54. Darryl Stingley of the New England Patriots was crippled for life because of a vicious,
though legal tackle by Jack Tatum of the Oakland Raiders. See J. TATUM, supra, at 223.
55. Lynn Swann, for example, suffered a concussion that prevented him from playing for
two weeks when George Atkinson of the Oakland Raiders hit him on th6 head with a forearm blow. See Note, Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Concern, supra note 4, at 796.
56. See note 52 supra. "I almost retired. It wasn't the intimidation, it was the unnecessary brutality. I couldn't see playing a game and risking my life." 126 CONG. REC. E3,712
(daily ed. July 31, 1980) (quoting Lynn Swann).
57. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d
516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
The incident occurred during a game between the Denver Broncos and the Cincinnati
Bengals. Dale Hackbart played free safety for the Broncos' defensive squad, and "Boobie"
Clark played fullback for the Bengal's offensive squad. A pass attempt was intercepted and
as a result the roles of the teams reversed and Hackbart attempted to block Clark as the
play went upfield. He fell to the ground and, while kneeling on one knee, Clark hit him with
a forearm to the neck. Hackbart suffered a fractured neck. Clark admitted the attack was
intentional, but asserted it was brought on by the frustration of losing. Although Hackbart
sued on six theories of liability, judgment was rendered for the defendants on the theory
that tort law principles were inapplicable because the injury was suffered during a professional football game. 435 F. Supp. at 352. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision and
remanded to the trial court for retrial. 601 F.2d 516 (D. Colo. 1979). The case has not yet
been decided.
58. The incident occurred when Tomjanovich rushed to break up a fight between one of
his teammates and Washington. "As Tomjanovich approached the pair Washington whirled
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jured player, sued Washington's employer, the Los Angeles
Lakers."

D.

Baseball

Baseball may have the least capacity for extreme violence of
these four sports. It does, however, have "the most dangerous
weapon in sports," the beanball." Because of this pitch, players
feel that their life is on the line when they step into the batter's
box. 1 Player violence in baseball usually consists of bench-clearing
brawls between opposing teams, as well as fights between individual players.e
E. Justification?
Despite these incidents, the sports establishment contends that
there is no uncontrolled excessive violence in any sport. 3 Rather,
they assert, the competitive nature of sports requires that a certain
amount of roughness be allowed." They also attribute hostile acts
to a normal release of emotions which result from the intensity of
and hit him with a punch which resulted in fractures of the face and skull, a broken nose, a
separated upper jaw, a cerebral concussion and severe lacerations around the mouth." Note,
Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Concern, supra note 4, at 796. Washington was fined
$10,000.00 and suspended for 60 days by NBA Commissioner Larry O'Brien. See Sprotzer,
supra note 3, at 3.
59. Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D Tex. Aug. 17, 1979). The
jury awarded Tomjanovich $1.8 million in actual damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. See Woolf, Courts Coming Down Hardon Excessively Violent Players, Nat'l L.J., Jan.
7, 1980, at 20, col. 4. The initial jury award was reduced $125,000.00 by the trial court. The
case was appealed and before it was argued an out-of-court settlement was reached. See 4
SPORTS L. REP. 6 (June, 1981).
60. For a thorough discussion of the beanball and the fear it engenders, see Kram, Their
Lives Are On The Line, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 18, 1975, at 32.
61. Id. See also R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 10.
62. These incidents usually develop when a batter attempts to retaliate against a pitcher
after being hit by a pitch or being narrowly missed by one. See, e.g., L. A. Times, Aug. 24,
1981, pt. III, at 1, col. 2. The most notable incident involvng two players occurred in 1965
between John Roseboro and Juan Marichal. The Los Angeles Dodgers and San Francisco
Giants were playing a weekend series and harsh words were exchanged between Roseboro,
the Dodger catcher, and members of the Giants. During the Sunday game Roseboro threw
the ball back to the pitcher and in so doing nicked Marichal's ear while he stood in the
batter's box. Marichal then struck Roseboro over the head with his bat, causing considerable
injury. Marichal was fined $1,750 by the league and suspended for eight games. Roseboro
filed a suit against Marichal and the Giants which was then settled out of court for
$7,500.00. R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 210 n.821.
63. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 118.

64. Id.

No. 3]1

VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

433

competition." Finally, the sports industry contends that the use of
modern media technology has called "special attention" to the
flagrant acts that have occurred." The latter argument has some
merit," but fighting as an outlet for frustration should not be considered an acceptable and necessary ingredient of sports.e

II.
Attempts at Deterrence and Control
The disciplining of athletes who commit acts that are considered
"detrimental" to a particular sport 9 is a function of that league's
officials.70 This long-standing policy of self-regulation, though, is
under scrutiny. Critics view this system as incapable of properly
handling the problem of excessive violence and ineffective as a
credible deterrent." The judicial system is being touted as a more
feasible and capable. alternative."

A. Internal Discipline
The league's7 4 power to discipline is not inherent in its structure
65. Id.
66. See Statement of Commissioner Pete Rozelle, December 13, 1977 (re: Violence in
Professional Football).
67. Increased media coverage of sports has indeed brought more attention to acts of violence by players. The fact remains, however, that violence is very much a part of American
sports and the public is concerned about it. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 11826; Mailbox: Violence Overshadowing Garden Hockey, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, § 5, at 3,
col. 1; notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra. There is the related issue of whether media
coverage fosters sports violence. The glorification and favorable press overly aggressive players receive does serve to encourage violent activity. See generally Steiner, Hit Men, SPORT,
Oct. 1981, at 21. Cf. R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 28-29 (favorable media portrayal of sports
violence reinforces the belief that such action is not criminal).
68. See Kirshenbaum, note 34 supra.
69. This statement refers to conduct on and off the field that could affect the sport's
public image.
70. See notes 74-85 and accompanying text, infra.
71. See Note, Criminal Law: Consent as a Defense to CriminalBattery-The Problem of
Athletic Contests, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 840 (1975).
72. See notes 87-93 and accompanying text, infra.
73. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text, supra.
74. The teams also possess significant disciplinary power. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining
Agreement, March 1, 1977, Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n (NFLPA)-Nat'l Football
League Management Council, art. VI [hereinafter cited as NFL Agreement]; Collective Bargaining Agreement, Oct. 10, 1980, Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n (NBPA)-Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n, art. XXI, § 3(d) [hereinafter cited as NBA Agreement]; Basic Agreement, Jan. 1,
1980, The League of Professional Baseball Clubs (American League)-The Nat'l League of
Professional Baseball Clubs (National League)-Major League Baseball Players Ass'n
(MLBPA), art. XI [hereinafter cited as Baseball Agreement]. The NHL does not provide
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but is derived from, and has its legal basis in, the consent of the
player.7 Management secures the player's consent through the use
of a standard player contract 7 and provisions set forth in the
league's by-laws. 7 The sanctions78 the league may impose on players who violate the game's safety rules79 form two categories: (1)
those that may be imposed while the game is in progress;" and (2)
those that may be imposed after the game as either remedial or
punitive measures.81 During the game, the responsibility of meting
out the appropriate sanctions rests upon league selected, on-thefield officials.8 2 After the game, the league's commissioner considers
egregious infractions of the safety rules.83 Each league usually vests
copies of their agreement to the public.
75. See Wiestart, Player Discipline in ProfessionalSports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 Wm.
& MARY L. Ray. 703 n.6 (1977); L. SOBEL, ProfessionalSports and the Law 421 (student ed.
1977).
76. For example, Paragraph 11 of the NFL Standard Player Contract provides that the
"[p]layer acknowledges the right and power of the Commissioner to fine and suspend . . .
any player . . . who is guilty of any conduct detrimental to the welfare of the league or of
professional football." Reprinted in L. SOBEL, supra note 75, at 421.
77. "Whenever the Commissioner, after notice and hearing, decides that . . . any
player . . . has either violated the Constitution or By-Laws of the league, or has
been or is guilty of conduct detrimental to the welfare of the league or professional football, then the Commissioner shall have complete authority to:
(1) suspend and/or fine such person in an amount not in excess of five thousand
dollars ($5,000) and/or
(2) Cancel any contract or agreement of such person with the league or with any
member thereof."
NFL CoNsT. & BY-LAws art. VIII, § 8.13 (1976).
78. For a listing of the sanctions at each league's disposal, see R. HoRRow, supra note 1,
at 69-73.
79. Safety rules serve the sole purpose of promoting player safety. Since 1962, the NFL
has implemented 33 rules that have the primary purpose of increasing player safety. See
NFL Rule Changes That Benefit Player Safety, (Final Update, June 23, 1981). In 1980, for
example, the league "[m]ade it illegal for a player to strike, swing, or club an opponent in
the head, neck, or face by a raking or continuous action even if the initial contact is below
the neck." Id. at 3.
80. They usually consist of penalties to the violator's team and/or expulsion of the violator from the game. See Comment, Civil Liability Between Professional Football Players,
supra note 13, at 746-47.
81. Usually monetary fines and/or player suspension, although contract termination is
also available. Id.
82. Id. These officials are commonly referred to as referees or umpires.
83. Commissioner Pete Rozelle of the NFL has stated that unnecessary violence outside
the rules of the game will be cause for league discipline whether or not it is detected by
game officials. See Statement of the NFL commissioner (Sept. 14, 1977). After the commissioner determines that the conduct warrants punishment, he has to notify the player of the
action taken. Should the player decide to appeal, the commissioner will designate a time
and place for a hearing. After the hearing, he makes the final and binding decision. See
NFL Agreement, supra note 74, art. VIII, § 1. It should be noted that the chief official for
the NHL is the President; although he carries a different title his function is the same as a
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an enormous amount of disciplinary power in the hands of its commissioner8 who possesses the power to render a full, final, and
binding decision in any matter "concerning the preservation of the
integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence" 85 in the
sport he oversees. Although the leagues have made significant attempts to curb the level of violence in the respective sports by
promulgating rules designed to promote player safety,8e the sanctions league officials currently impose8 are ineffective in preventing and discouraging infractions bf the safety rules by players."
For the most part, the fines and suspensions assessed serve no
deterrent value. The fines are relatively nominal when one considers the exceedingly large salaries of professional athletes," and the
suspensions are usually too lenient given the nature of the offense.90 In those cases where the penalties assessed were severe,
some players have claimed that the team paid the fine.' 1 Such conduct on the part of management serves to effectively negate the
deterrence value of a severe penalty."' Also, penalties become less
effective when management encourages those acts the penalties
commissioner's.
84. In baseball, the respective league presidents are also vested with significant disciplinary powers. See Baseball Agreement, supra note 74, art. IX(A).
85. Id. art. X(A)(1)(6). See NFL Agreement supra note 74, art. VIII, § 1; NBA Agreement, supra note 74, art. XXI, § 1(f). The league Commissioner is usually selected by the
club owners. See Weistart, supra note 75, at 715 n.46.
86. See note 79, supra. Major League Baseball officials have taken steps to eliminate
beanball wars as a common occurrence in the sport. See R. HoRnow, supra note 1, at 73.
87. See note 78, supra.
88. See Comment, Civil Liability Between ProfessionalFootball Players, supra note 13,
at 748.
89. For example, Marvin Webster of the New York Knicks was fined $2,000.00 for his
involvement in a fight with another player during a basketball game last season. At that
time Webster earned a salary in excess of $500,000.00 per year. See Sprotzer, supra note 3,
at 6. In the NHL last season, Bobby Schmautz of the Vancouver Canucks and Pat Hughes
of the Pittsburg Penguins were both fined $200.00 for a stick-swinging incident between
them. See Edes, More Fines for 2 Stick Swingers?, L. A. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, pt. III, at 16,
col. 2. In 1980 the average salary of a professional hockey player was in excess of $100,000.00
per year. See Comment, Sport in Court: The Legality of Professional Football'sSystem of
Reserve and Compensation, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 252, 253 n.13 (1980).
90. "[NHL officials] feel that the use of a stick against an opponent is the most serious
foul . . . [in hockey] because of the potential dangers involved." Edes, supra, at 2, col. 3
(quoting Brian O'Neill, Executive Vice-President of the NHL). Yet, last season Behn Wilson of the Philadelphia Flyers and Danny Gare of the Buffalo Sabres were involved in a
stick-swinging incident and both were suspended for only three games. The same threegame suspension was levied against Bobby Schmautz and Pat Hughes for their stick-swinging incident last year. Id. at 16, col. 2.
91. See R. Hoanow, supra note 1, at 75.
92. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 123.
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were designed to prevent.98

The imposition of severe penalties for violation of the safety
rules can be an effective deterrent to excessive violence in professional sports." Because management" possesses sole disciplinary
powers, however, it has been able to maintain violence as an integral part of sports. This situation will remain so long as management views violence as marketable and profitable."

B. The Intrusion of Criminal Law Into the Sports
Arena
The rationale for the intrusion of criminal law into the realm of
professional sports is that self-regulation has been ineffective as a
means of controlling excessive violence and protecting the athletes.' 7 One commentator argues that to preclude the intervention
of criminal law would be tantamount to allowing a segment of society to commit crime with impunity;" thus, if the athlete were immune from criminal sanctions merely because of his participation
in a sporting event, the commission of acts of violence would "become the order of the day.""

1. The Application of Criminal Sanctions to Professional Athletes
There have been few criminal prosecutions of professional athletes,100 and those that have occurred have involved hockey play93. Id. "[Management] expects you to do what you get fined for." R. HORROW, supra note
1, at 75 (quoting an unidentified player).
94. See Comment, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 766; R. HORROW, supra note 1, at
76-78; THE SPORTING NEWS, note 52 supra. Penalties as severe as those levied against
Kermit Washington ($10,000 fine and a 60-day suspension) cost a player a substantial
amount of money, cost the team the loss of the player's services, and, as such, are more
likely to deter acts of violence.
95. Management includes the team owners, league presidents, and commissioners.
96. "Many in sports management feel that violence is necessary to the game. They not
only condone it, but encourage it. They feel it sells tickets and creates fan interest." Woolf,
supra note 59, at 20. See also note 39 & accompanying text supra.
97. See Sprotzer, supra note 3, at 4.
98. See Flakne & Caplan, supra note 8, at 33. "[T]he enforcement of criminal laws should
not stop at the admitting gates of sporting events." Id. at 34.
99. Id. at 35.
100. There has been one successful criminal prosecution of an amateur athlete. People v.
Freer, 86 Misc. 2d 280 (1976). John Freer was found guilty of third degree criminal assault
for punching another player in the eye while participating in a football game. During the
course of a tackle the complainant punched the defendant in the throat. As both players fell
to the ground there was a pileup. After all the players got off the defendant he punched the
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ers. The first of these prosecutions occurred in Canada in 1970
where Wayne Maki and Ted Green were both tried on criminal
assault charges. 01 The only American prosecution of a professional
athlete occurred in 1975 when Dave Forbes was tried on criminal
assault charges.10

In most jurisdictions where assault is alleged, the prosecution
must show that the defendant intended to cause the injury.10 3 Intent, though an essential element of the crime, is most difficult to
prove in the sports setting because of the environment in which
the athlete operates.104
(a) The Consent Defense
The defense of consent'05 of the victim, recognized at common
law,106 stands as the primary legal barrier to the successful prosecution of athletes on criminal assault charges.'07 Hockey, football,
basketball, and baseball all call for physical contact and intimidation that would normally be considered assaults.' 0 ' By voluntarily
participating in these sports, the player impliedly gives his consent
to such contact. 09
complainant in the eye. The court held that the defense of consent was not available to the
defendant as he intended to punch the complainant. Self-defense was also disallowed as the
defendant could not have reasonably believed he was vulnerable to further attack.
101. Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970); Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d
137 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970). See note 34, supra.
102. State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., dismissed Aug. 12, 1975). See note 1
supra.
103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.22 (West 1970) (repealed 1979).
104. "[T]he player [who performs] in a setting in which violence is customary and approved does not act with criminal intent but merely follows the established practices of the
sport." Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 1, at 28.
105. "The consent defense in a sports assault case essentially involves the claim that since
a player assumes a certain amount of risk of injury due to the nature of the game, the
assaulting player may assert that the assaulted player consented to the act." 1977 HoUSE
REPORT, supra note 24, at 124. For a general discussion of the consent defense, see W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 57, at 408-13 (1972).
106. For an analysis of the common law treatment of the consent defense in sports cases,
see Comment, The Consent Defense: Sports, Violence, and the Criminal Law, 13 Au. CiuM.
L. REV. 235 (1975).

107. See R. HORROw, supra note 1, at 167.
108. See Hechter, supra note 32, at 433.
"[T]he game of hockey as it is played in the National Hockey League . .. could
not possibly be played at the speed at which it is played and with the force and
vigour with which it is played, and with the competition that enters into it, unless
there were a great number of what would in normal circumstances be called
assaults."
Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d at 140.
109. See Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICa. L. REv. 148, 156
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The major difficulty the consent defense presents, however, is
determining the scope of player consent.110 The court in Regina v.
Green acknowledged this problem and concluded that it would be
very difficult for a player, embroiled in the intensity of an athletic
contest, to stop and determine whether an act he is about to commit constitutes an assault.' The Maki court, however, was able to
conclude that "no athlete should be presumed to accept malicious,
unprovoked or overly violent attack.""' Unprovoked savage acts
resulting in serious injury are the only acts of violence that should
subject a player to criminal prosecution.113 Although a case may fit
the standard delineated in Maki, there are additional defenses to a
charge of assault the defendant may successfully raise.
(b) Involuntary Reflex
The defense of involuntary reflex action is predicated on the theory that the violent act committed by the player was instinctive
rather than premeditated.1 1 ' His action results from attitudes in(1976). "Thus all players, when they step onto a playing field or ice surface, assume certain
risks and hazards of the sport, and in most cases the defense of consent . . . would be
applicable." Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d at 167. One commentator has argued that implied
consent is necessary for contact sports to exist. See Hecter, supra note 32, at 433.
110. See Note, Criminal Law: Consent as a Defense to Criminal Battery-The Problem
of Athletic Contests, supra note 71, at 844; R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 169. Much debate
has occurred as to what standard should be applied in determining the scope of player consent in an athletic contest. See Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, supra
note 109, at 156-57. The problem is essentially finding the threshold of violent conduct
above which a player does not consent. To resolve the problem various tests have been
recommended. First, the "rules of the game" test states that player consent is not given to
acts which are prohibited by the rules and customs of the game. The "magnitude of the act"
test states that the participating athletes consents to "reasonable" action on the part of
another player, regardless of whether the conduct was within the scope of the rules. Third,
the "magnitude of the harm" test states that the athlete consents to acts during a game
which have no potential for serious bodily harm; all others are actionable. The fourth test is
one of foreseeability and states that the injured player consents only to those acts or harms
which were reasonably foreseeable when he entered the game. For a full discussion of these
tests and the problems they have, see R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 171-85.
111. 16 D.L.R.3d at 141. A related and crucial issue is whether the incident in question
occurred in or out of the play. Several of the jurors in the Forbes trial who voted for conviction stated that had the incident occurred in the play, they would have been reluctant to
convict regardless of the extent of the injury. See Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 1, at
29.
112. 14 D.L.R.3d at 167. Accord, Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d at 143.
113. If every contact between players triggered liability and criminal prosecution, the
quality of play in professional sports would deteriorate; player competitiveness would be
reduced and the threat of prosecution for vigorous and spirited play might cause players to
quit the sport. See R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 121-23; 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 24,
at 124.
114. R. HORROw, supra note 1, at 201.
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stilled in him at an early age," 5 combined with the high level of
pressure and emotion associated with sports."" The latter point
was asserted by the court in the Green case and was the basis of
Green's acquittal." 7 This defense was also successfully raised in
the Forbes case."e
(c) Self-Defense
A defendant in a sports violence action may assert that he acted
in self defense. Whether he will be successful, however, depends
upon attendant circumstances. The force the defendant used must
not only have been reasonable," 9 but the defendant must also have
reasonably believed that it was necessary to use such force 20 and
that the threatened harm was imminent.' 2 ' When a defendant asserts such a defense, the trier of fact must analyze the circumstances surrounding the act as well as the state of mind of the accused at the time in question.""
(d) Criminal Law Limitations
In addition to the problems"" criminal prosecutors in sports violence cases face, there are inherent limitations in the criminal law
that make it an unfeasible means of control. For criminal law to be
effectively applied to any group or organization, the group must
perceive the law as being both appropriate and credible as a social
control mechanism."' Criminal penalties serve minimal deterrent
115. Id. at 202.
116. Id.
117. "We must remember that we are dealing with a hockey game.... We are not
now dealing with the ordinary facts of life, the ordinary going and coming. We
must remember that when we discuss the action of these men we are examining it
within that forum and we are discussing it within the context in which the game is
played, at high speed and obviously with people keenly on edge. In these circumstances I find as a fact that Mr. Green's action . .

.

was instinctive."

Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d at 142 (emphasis added).
118. See R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 201.
119. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 105, § 53, at 392.
120. Id. at 393.
121. Id. at 394.
122. See, e.g., Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d at 166.
123. See notes 103-22 & accompanying text, supra.For a full discussion of the evidentiary
problems the prosecutor in a sports violence case faces, see Letourneau & Manganas, Violence in Sports: Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Prosecutions,16 0sGOODE HAL, L.J. 577
(1978).
124. The professional sports establishment does not view the conduct of its members on
the playing field as warranting criminal prosecution. This "'mentality' . . . mitigates
against the effectiveness of the traditional criminal law as a mechanism to control exceptionally severe acts of sports violence." R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 12.
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purposes because the acts that would subject players to liability
are not perceived by them as criminal but rather as part of the
game.' Criminal prosecution, then, may well be ineffective in controlling sports violence.
Moreover, in sports violence cases, one might argue that the
sport, rather than the individual, is on trial. The individual may
then be viewed as the "scapegoat" who is unjustly prosecuted for
the level of violence in the particular sport.1 26
Consistency is another problem with sports violence prosecutions. Since the decision to prosecute is discretionary,12 7 sports violence cases may be vigorously prosecuted in some jurisdictions and
completely ignored in others.1 28 Such haphazard enforcement
would eradicate any effectiveness the criminal law may have as a
deterrent to sports violence. 129 Also, courts could set variant standards for determining the criminality of an act, thus causing chaos
because of the lack of uniformity.130

2. The Sports Violence Act of 1980
Congressman Ronald Mottl (D-Ohio) has proposed the Sports
Violence Act of 1980181 which would make it a federal crime for
professional athletes to use excessive physical force against another
player during the course of a sports event.1 32 However, the intervention of federal criminal law enforcement authorities into the
sports violence issue is considered unwarranted and unnecessary."
125. Id. at 119. "[Players] . . . argue that intimidation, retaliation, and violently aggressive tactics have always been an accepted part of the game, so they fail to see why they
should be punished for playing within these unwritten rules." 1977 HouSE REPORT, supra
note 24, at 123-24. See also note 93, supra.
126. See Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 1, at 28. Cf. R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at
125 (athletes form a subgroup and because each member acts the same way, it is unfair to
punish only one individual).
127. For a full discussion of the factors that influence whether a prosecutor decides to
prosecute a sports violence case, see R. HoRnow, supra note 1, at 110-60.
128. Id. at 113.
129. See Hallowell & Meshbesher, supra note 1, at 28.
130. See R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 146.
131. H.R. 7903 was introduced on July 31, 1980 and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary. Hearings were held, but no action was taken. The bill was reintroduced on March
3, 1981 (H.R. 2263) and its status remains the same. Near the publication deadline for this
Note, Congressman Ronald M. Mottl reintroduced the Sports Violence Act under a new
name. It is now the Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981 (H.R. 5079). A copy of the bill
was unavailable for review as of the publication deadline.
132. The bill provides for a $5000 fine or one year imprisonment or both.
133. See Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Edward Garvey); notes
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Further, the bill is replete with problems that will make enforcement extremely difficult.'"
In situations involving personal violence, protection of the public
safety is normally a function of state law enforcement authorities.185 Federal action is usually limited to those situations which
involve "officers or employees of the United States, foreign
officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons
. . . ." 186 Proponents of the bill argue that the failure of past at-

tempts1 7 to curb violence in professional sports necessitates the
intervention of federal criminal law enforcement authorities.'"
They also contend that the act will provide for uniform administration of the law, thereby resolving the problem of inconsistent
criminal prosecutions by state authorities which result from varying assault and battery statutes.189
Successful criminal prosecutions will not be more easily achieved
at the federal level than at the state level. The federal courts will
also face the problem of drawing that fine line separating violent
conduct which is considered a part of the game from that which is
excessive and unnecessary.1 4 0 This problem prevented successful
criminal prosecutions at the state level141 and is exacerbated by the
bill's ambiguous language." Those issues which could not be judi143-45 and accompanying text, infra.
134. See note 142 & accompanying text, infra.
135. See Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of James S. Reynolds,
Deputy Chief, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of

Justice).
136. Id.
137. Past attempts include internal regulation, and local law enforcement. See Sprotzer,
supra note 3, at 4.
138. "[Plast attempts to curb violence in professional sports have been lacking in their
vigor and the time has come for a new approach." Id.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Mottl concedes this point. See 126 CONG. REC., supra note 56, at E3,711.
141. See Hallowell and Meshbesher, supra note 1, at 29; note 111, supra.
142. For example, the bill defines excessive physical force as that amount of force which
"has no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of the sport; is unreasonably violent; and . . . [is not] a normal hazard . . . [of the] sport." H.R. 2263, supra note 131, at 2.

Most observers would agree that the "competitive goal" of sport is to win, and "[i]f you're
going to win, you're going to be so keyed up that maybe once in a while you'll over-play a
guy. You might give him an extra shot. . . ." 1977 HousE REPoRT, supra note 24, at 122
(quoting former Washington Redskin quarterback, Billy Kilmer). This has been an accepted
part of professional football for a long time. Id. Further, the use of such terms as "unreasonably violent" and "normal hazard" do not lessen the line-drawing problems the trier of fact
will face. See Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 5-6 (Statement of Edward Garvey).
Also, "[t]he Government would have to prove as elements of the offense that a defendant
knowingly used 'excessive physical force,' and thereby caused 'a risk of significant bodily
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cially resolved at the state level will also not be capable of resolution at the federal level.
A fundamental question is whether the resolution of the sports
violence problem should be a priority of the federal government. 4 3
Since local police organizations usually provide security at professional sports events, they are better able to respond to eruptions
of exceptional violence among the game's participants."14 Consequently, the initial response to, and investigation of, cases involving sports violence would continue to be accomplished by local authorities."' This indicates that the handling of these matters
should remain a function of state law enforcement authorities.

C. Civil Liability
The criminal law process is not designed to provide compensation for injuries an athlete wrongfully suffers during the course of
play.'" Compensation for the wrongfully injured person, however,
is the primary purpose of tort law.'4 7 Until recently, few professional athletes sought civil judicial remedies for injuries caused by
another while playing.14 8 Most of these actions followed the case of
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.14 9 where the court held that
tort principles were applicable to cases involving injuries suffered
injury'. . . . [T]his language would be challenged as being unconstitutionally vague."
Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of James S. Reynolds) (emphasis
added).
143. "The prevailing attitude against passage of the bill is that government should concern itself with pressing national problems and leave the regulation of sports to the respective leagues." Sprotzer, supra note 3, at 8.
144. See Hearings on H.R. 7903, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of James S. Reynolds).
145. Id.
146. See Note, Liability in Professional Sports, supra note 5, at 927.
147. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs, § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
148. In addition to the Hackbart and Tomjanovich cases, see notes 57-59 & accompanying text, supra, Richard Rhodes, a rookie guard trying to win a spot on the Chicago Bulls
basketball roster, won a total of $125,000 in damages from the Kansas City Kings and guard
Lucius Allen after Allen broke Rhodes' jaw in an exhibition game. See Ranii, supra note 5,
at 1. Henry Boucha filed a civil action against Dave Forbes, the Boston Bruins, and the
NHL, but dropped his action when an out-of-court settlement was reached. He reportedly
collected between $1 million and $2 million. Id. at 30. Earlier this year, Mike Robitaille, a
former hockey player, was awarded $435,000 in damages because his former club, the Vancouver Canucks, breached their duty of care to him. Robitaille was forced to play hockey
while injured and team doctors failed to examine him properly when he complained of the
injury. He is now permanently disabled. See 4 SPORTs L. REP. 2 (June, 1981).
149. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979). For the facts of this case see note 57, supra.
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during a professional sports event.15 0 The success of a professional
athlete's civil suit depends on the theory of liability he adopts, as
most tort theories have limited applicability in the sports
context.' 5 '
1.

Assault & Battery

Should the injured athlete seek liability based on a theory of assault and battery, 5 he would have to prove that the defendant
intended to both commit the act, and cause the harm.'"5 And, as
discussed above,'" he would have to contend with the defense of
consent and any other defenses the defendant feels are applicable.
2.

Negligence

In an action founded on negligence, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant was under a duty to him to conform to a certain
standard of conduct." A defendant who subjects the plaintiff to
an unreasonable risk of harm and thus causes an injury breaches
this duty.'56 The defenses of assumption of risk'5 7 and contributory
150. 601 F.2d at 524.
151. See notes 152-76 and accompanying text, infra. Also, the theory of liability the
player adopts may very well be determined by the nature of the sport he plays. See note 159
and accompanying text, infra.
152. Assault and battery do not have to exist together; the difference between them is
that battery requires physical contact, whereas assault requires only the apprehension of
physical contact. W. PROSSER, supra note 147, § 10, at 41.
153. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 525.
154. See notes 105-22 and accompanying text, supra.
155. See W. PROSSER, supra note 147, § 30, at 143. The trial court in Hackbart stated
that the issue of duty of care raises the question of reasonableness. In this case the question
would be what a reasonably prudent professional football player can be expected to do
under the circumstances that confronted Clark when the incident occurred. 435 F. Supp. at
355. The court concluded that "[ilt is wholly incongruous to talk about a professional football player's duty of care for the safety of opposing players when he has been trained and
motivated to be heedless of injury to himself." Id. at 356. Further, "[t]he character of NFL
competition negates any notion that the playing conduct can be circumscribed by any standard of reasonableness." Id. The appellate court, however, found that the general customs
and rules of football do not include the intentional striking or punching of others. These
restraints, the court stated, do establish boundaries wherein a player's conduct must conform to some standard of reasonableness. 601 F.2d at 521. Despite the finding of a duty to
refrain from conduct like Clark's, a negligence action could not be maintained. See note 159
and accompanying text, infra.
156. See W. PROSSER, supra note 147, § 30, at 143.
157. "Generally, a participant assumes all the ordinary and inherent risks attendant to a
sport. An assumed risk precludes the existence of a duty and thereby relieves the defendant
of any legal wrong for his conduct." 19 Duq. L. REV. 191 at 195 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
For a full discussion of the assumption of risk defense in professional sports, see Comment,
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or comparative negligence 58 may be asserted in this situation. A
negligence cause of action, though, has limited applicability in the
sports context. For example, the court in Hackbart held that negligence is inapplicable when the injury is sustained during a football
game, because "subjecting another to [an] unreasonable risk of
harm, the essence of negligence, is inherent in the game of football,
for admittedly it is violent."159

3. Reckless Misconduct
Reckless misconduct was found applicable to the facts in the
Hackbart case.160 Liability on this theory requires a finding that
the defendant intentionally committed an act knowing he would be
subjecting the plaintiff to a substantial risk of harm.'' The defendant, however, is not required to have intended to cause the harm
which results." The appropriate defenses to such a charge are assumption of risk' and conduct on the part of the plaintiff in reckless disregard of his own safety.1 64

4. Employer Liability
The injured player may also seek to establish liability in his assailant's employer by invoking the theories of respondeat superior
and negligent supervision.1 e5
Assumption of Risk and Vicarious Liability in PersonalInjury Actions Brought by Professional Athletes, 1980 DUKE L.J. 742 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Assumption of Risk].
158. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection." W. PROSSER, supra note 147, § 65, at 416-17
(footnotes omitted).
159. 601 F.2d at 520. The court's language seems to imply that a negligence cause of
action may be brought in cases where the injury was sustained while playing a sport not as
inherently violent as football or hockey. See, e.g., Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff only assumes the risk of injury resulting from incidents commoi to the sport). Also, a negligence cause of action could not be maintained in Hackbart
because Clark's act was intentional. The court found that negligence consists of "mere inadvertence, lack of skillfulness or failure to take precautions." 601 F.2d at 524.
160. 601 F.2d at 525. See note 57, supra for the facts of this case.
161. 601 F.2d at 524 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
162. Id.
163. Hackbart, 435 F. Supp. at 356. See note 157 supra.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503 (1965). This defense is most applicable
in the sports context because players often dive for loose balls, make diving catches, etc.,
and, as a result, subject themselves to greater chances of injury.
165. For a full discussion of these concepts, see Note, Torts in Sports, note 32, supra.
These theories were the basis of the claim in the Tomjanovich case. See notes 58 and 59,
supra for the facts of this case.
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(a) Respondeat Superior
Generally, an employer is held vicariously liable for the acts of
his employees when a master-servant relationship exists between
them.'" Such a relationship exists when the employer has control
over, or the right to control, the performance of the employee's duties.' The plaintiff must also prove that the tortious act which
caused his injury was committed within the scope of the defendant's duties as an employee.' To be within the scope of employment, the conduct must be of the same nature as authorized conduct, or incidental to authorized conduct."O In addition, if the act
was intentional, it must have been committed to further the employer's business. The success of a suit based on respondeat superior, however, depends on the facts of the case as well as the
jurisdiction in which the action is brought."7 ' As some jurisdictions
apply the doctrine more narrowly than others, their standards for
recovery are stricter.17 2
(b) Negligent Supervision
The second basis upon which an employer's liability may be established is negligent supervision. 7 This theory is predicated on
166. See Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 778. The rationale for passing liability
for an employee's torts to the employer is that the losses caused by such conduct should be
considered a cost of doing business. Further, such liability will provide incentive for the
employer to be more careful in selecting, instructing and supervising his employees. W.
PROSSER, supra note 147, § 69, at 459.
167. See Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 779; The author argues that a masterservant relationship exists in professional sports because management has the power to enforce dress codes and curfews, terminate contracts, and discipline players. Id. at 779-81.
168. Id. at 781. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 147, § 70, at 460-61.
169. See Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 781.
170. Id. at 782. See W. PROSSER, supra note 147, § 70, at 464.
171. Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 781.
172. Id. at 782-83. "In jurisdictions that apply the [vicarious] liability doctrine narrowly,
vicarious liability for unauthorized intentional torts attaches only if the employee was acting
in furtherance of his employer's interest." Id. at 782 (footnotes omitted). In these jurisdictions (e.g. Iowa and Kansas) the employee's act must have been in response to conduct on
the part of the plaintiff which interfered with the employee's ability to perform his duties
successfully for the employer to be held liable. Under this standard, absent a finding that
the act was either expressly or impliedly authorized, it is unlikely that a team will be held
liable for a player's conduct. Id. at 782-83. In jurisdictions that apply the doctrine more
liberally (e.g. California) the employer may be liable for the employee's conduct if the act is
incidental to the performance of the employee's duties. "Under this standard if a player
strikes an opponent out of anger and frustration developed over the course of [a] game, the
team may be subject to liability." Id. California Law was followed in the Tomjanovich case.
Id. at 784.
173. For an analysis of the differences between negligent supervision and respondeat superior see Note, Tort Liability in Professional Sports, 44 ALB. L. REV. 696 (1980).
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the idea that the employer is expected to use reasonable care in
selecting and retaining employees who, because of the nature of
their activities, will come into contact with third persons.17 4 The
employer, then, has a duty to investigate the prospective employee's background before hiring him. Once the individual is
hired, the employer must exercise reasonable care in supervising
the employee's activities.175 For liability to be passed on to the employer, however, it must be shown that there was either actual or
presumptive notice to the employer as to the employee's tendency
to commit tortious acts.17

5. Tort Law Limitations
Civil sanctions, like criminal sanctions,17 7 have limited applicability in sports violence cases. As previously discussed, there are a
limited number of theories upon which an injured player may successfully establish liability in another for his injury.1 78 In a civil
action the trier of fact will also face the problem of drawing the
line that separates actionable conduct from acceptable conduct
during play.179 Thus, only players who are injured by acts of violence committed out of the play have a good chance of recovering
damages from another athlete and/or his team.
Because tort law differs from one jurisdiction to another, the results of civil actions will be unpredictable and inconsistent;180 an
injured player may recover damages in one jurisdiction, while another player, injured under similar circumstances, is denied damages in another jurisdiction.181
Civil actions cannot be an effective deterrent to sports violence
unless damages are assessed against the defendant.182 Their effectiveness as a deterrent, however, depends upon the injured player's
174. See Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 787-88.
175. Id. at 788.
176. See Note, Tort Liability in Professional Sports, supra note 173, at 709. "According
to papers filed by Tomjanovich, Washington had been involved in seven separate incidents
in which he used or attempted to use his fists in only three years as a Laker, all prior to the
incident involving Tomjanovich." 4 SPORTS L. REP. 6 (June, 1981).
177. See Part 11 (B), supra.
178. See Part II (C), supra.
179. "[If] [t]he blow [had arisen] out of the normal pushing and shoving inherent in the
game . . . the case would have been more difficult." Comment, Assumption of Risk, supra
note 157, at 755 (re: Rudy Tomjanovich).
180. See, e.g., Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 791.
181. Id.

182. See generally Note, Torts in Sports, supra note 32, at 790-93.
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interest in instituting an action against another player and/or his
team. Because of internal pressures, a player's incentive to file a
suit may be lessened.188 An alternative to the civil suit is needed.

III.
Self-Regulation: The Need for Internal Structural
Reform
Criminal law enforcement authorities have been unable to punish athletes for acts committed during a game.18" In addition, criminal sanctions cannot control player conduct during a game because of inherent limitations in the criminal law when used in the
professional sports setting.188 Therefore, the responsibility of policing sports activity should remain a function of the leagues. The
leagues are in a better position than the courts to define and enforce specific rules of conduct.'" They do not have to wait until
cases come before them to establish standards for player conduct
during the game.18 7 Also, because of the close contact league management and players have with the game, they are better able to
determine what constitutes reasonable conduct under game conditions.188 A system of league control may also be more flexible than
one involving public control because the leagues can exercise control over a wider range of conduct." For example, league enforcement could conceivably extend to conduct a prosecutor would not
consider prosecuting. 190 In addition, because league control is centrally administered, playing standards would be consistent and
uniformly enforced.'91 The variance in enforcement practices that
characterizes public law enforcement would thus be avoided.1" In
short, the leagues can much more efficiently and effectively control
and deter sports violence.
Effective self-regulation requires vigorous enforcement of rules
183. "Fear that they might be blacklisted throughout the league as [troublemakers] may
discourage players from initiating lawsuits." Id. at 791.
184. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
185. See notes 123-30 and accompanying text supra.
186. See Weistart, supra note 75, at 729 n.91.
187. Id.
188. See Comment, Violence in ProfessionalSports, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 771, 784.
189. See Weistart, supra note 75, at 729 n.91.
190. Id. For example, a prosecutor would probably not prosecute a player for going into
the stands after a heckler. League officials, however, have fined players for doing just that.
See, e.g., note 31 supra.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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promulgated to contr6l player conduct and promote player safety.
Such enforcement will not preclude the state or local authorities
from instituting criminal actions, but may serve to reduce the need
for them to do so."
At present, the power to discipline players rests solely in the
hands of management.19 4 The commissioner, management's chief
representative, possesses the power to render final and binding decisions in cases that affect the public image of the sport.' As a
result, cases involving on-the-field violence are heard and decided
by him alone.196 Because the commissioner is usually selected by
the team owners,19 7 he is viewed as being dependent on them."e8
The owners determine and pay his salary,'99 have the authority to
modify his powers,2 00 and retain the right to fire him.2 0 ' Under
these circumstances, one cannot expect the commissioner to render
decisions contrary to the owners' basic interests.2 0 ' As discussed
above, 03 management will condone and promote violence so long
as it is profitable. Therefore, the likelihood that the commissioner
will impose severe sanctions on an athlete for egregious infractions
of the rules is limited.
The present internal disciplinary system also suffers from a lack
of fairness because fines are assessed against players without the
benefit of a hearing. 0 The present system is also inconsistent 0
and does not provide for appeals to an objective third party.20 6
193. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 190 (1979).
194. See notes 74-85 and accompanying text, supra.
195. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
196. See, e.g., note 83, supra. In the National Hockey League, however, these cases are
heard by Executive Vice-President Brian O'Neill. See generally Edes, note 89 supra.
197. See note 85, supra.
198. See R. HORROW, supra note 1, at 85.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See notes 39, 96 and accompanying text, supra.
204. Only through an appeal is the player able to contest the penalty assessed against
him. See, e.g., note 83, supra.
205. Players who have a reputation for very aggressive play are often disciplined for acts
that do not warrant such action. On the other hand, acts by other players against them that
do warrant some form of disciplinary action often go unnoticed by league officials. See e.g.,
J. TATUM, note 53 supra, at 44-45; Zimmerman, The Raiders Regain a Lost Art, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 26, 1981, 70, 73.
206. See, e.g., note 83, supra. "The most distressing thing is that we were forced to appeal
to (Commissioner Pete) Rozelle, who made the fine in the first place." Balzer, note 52, supra
(quoting Herb Rudoy, agent for Chicago Bears player Mike Hartenstine).

I
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For these reasons, the present internal disciplinary system of the
major sports leagues should be dismantled and replaced by one
that can more effectively handle the sports violence problem.

A. Joint Committee on Player Discipline
For self-regulation to be effective, player participation in the
process of promulgating and enforcing rules of conduct is essential.20 7 The players must have a role in establishing and enforcing
the rules of conduct during a game because it is their physical wellbeing which is at stake. 08 They, therefore, have the greatest interest in eliminating excessive violence. Further,no one will be more
stringent with players who violate the rules than their peers.2 09
The players are also in an ideal position to monitor conduct during
a game because they are the participants, as well as the perpetrators of the acts in question. As part of their collective bargaining
agreement the league management and the players' association
should form a Joint Committee on Player Discipline. This committee, comprised of both labor and management representatives,210
should be solely responsible for disciplining players for conduct
during a game. As a result, the commissioner would no longer perform this disciplinary function by himself. Management may, however, select him as one of its representatives on the committee. The
committee should be responsible for drafting rules of player conduct during the game," and determining the appropriate sanc207. "Under NLRB interpretation of the collective bargaining obligation, the players' associations must participate in the development of, or at least agree to, rules changes such as
would be required in this case." 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 126.
208. Because acts of violence contribute to player injuries and injuries threaten a player's
career and his source of income, the sports violence issue should be viewed as a matter
which relates to the terms and conditions of employment. The players associations would
then be able to make their participation in the handling of the sports violence problem a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. "[T]he subject matter of collective bargaining in
professional sports . . . include all matters that relate to the terms and conditions of the
employment of athletes." J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 193, at 813.
209. Sports Violence: Hearings on H.R. 2263 Before The Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Statement of Brig Owens, Ass't Executive Director, NFLPA). Unpublished hearings; copy on file at the Comm/ENT L. J. office.
210. The committee should be composed of either 5 or 7 individuals. The odd member
should be a neutral party; the supervisor of umpires or referees could fill this position.
211. The goal of the committee in drafting these rules is to ensure player safety. Player
safety, however, will be ensured only if the rules are clear as to what acts are proscribed.
Consistent enforcement of these rules by the referees on the field is also essential to the
success of this program. Players with a reputation for aggressive play can no longer be singled out for disciplinary action. All violators of the rules must be dealt with appropriately.
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tions for the violation of these rules. 1 The penalties for a player's

violating the rules of conduct during a game must parallel the
magnitude of the violation.21 " Therefore, expulsion of a player from
the sport must not be ruled out as a possible sanction.21 4 Penalties
against coaches and management must also be assessed in those
cases where it is found that these parties authorized the player's
conduct.2 15
It would not be feasible for the committee to monitor each game
as it is being played. Therefore, the committee should consider determining whether an act warrants disciplinary action by reviewing
game films and referee reports. An action may also be instituted if
another player, or team, files a grievance with the committee and
requests disciplinary action.
The committee must also draft rules of procedure to ensure fundamental fairness and procedural due process. Therefore, guidelines regarding notice and how the hearing is to be conducted must
be established.
In addition, the committee must incorporate an appeals process
into the system to mitigate the effects of arbitrariness by the committee itself. A viable means to accomplish this goal is through the
use of independent arbitrators who will hear a grievance on appeal
and render a final and binding decision. The selection of the arbitrator, or arbitrators, does not have to be a function of the committee. Instead, that responsibility could be delegated to other labor
and management representatives.
The proposed disciplinary system is much fairer than the current one. The players' involvement in the process will result in
greater efficiency and more effective control and deterrence of excessive violence in professional sports. Consequently, there will be
fewer threats of intrusion by the criminal justice system, the
sport's public image will be enhanced, and labor and management
212. These sanctions should be a combination of fines and suspensions without pay. I
recommend that the committee determine fines based on a percentage of the player's salary.
As a result, higher-paid players will not have an advantage over lesser-paid players.
213. In other words, the more flagrant the infraction, the more severe the fine and suspension must be.
214. Such action may be necessary in a situation where the act was intentional and resulted in serious injury to another player. Also, players who constantly violate the rules may
be subject to expulsion.
215. In this situation a severe fine is probably the most feasible means to discipline management. Fines in this instance should be based on a percentage of the club's revenues.
Coaches, however, should be subject to both fines and suspensions.
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should be more unified.

B.

Compensation for the Injured Player

The major sports leagues do not provide an internal procedure
by which a player injured by an act of violence can seek damages.
In addition, the injured player may be precluded from seeking
damages from his assailant.' The injured player, however, may be
eligible for certain league-provided disability benefits 17 and, depending upon the gravity of his injury, may be eligible for additional insurance and pension benefits."' The player may also seek
compensation under Worker's Compensation statutes.2 1
These programs do not adequately indemnify players injured by
an act of violence. The player receives the same amount of compensation he would have received if he had sustained the injury
under normal game conditions. The filing of a civil suit against another player, his team, or both, becomes the only means by which
the injured player can be duly compensated. The judicial route,
however, does not guarantee recovery of damages because most
tort theories have limited applicability in sports violence cases.220
Consequently, the player is limited to a few theories on which he
can maintain a cause of action. 2 In addition, the courts will face
the problem of distinguishing actionable conduct from acceptable
conduct during the course of a game. As a result, the only athletes
216. For example, by express agreement, a professional basketball player waives all his
claims against another player for injuries he may receive from the other player's violent
conduct. See NBA Agreement, supra note 74, art. XIX, § 5.
217. For example, the National Football League (NFL) provides that if the injured player
was placed on the injured reserve list because he was physically unable to perform, he will
still be paid his full contract salary. See NFL Agreement, supra note 74, art. XVIII, § 2.
Also, if the player's contract was terminated the season following the one in which an injury
prevented him from playing in all, or part, of the team's last game, the player is eligible to
receive 50 percent of his contract salary, but no more than $37,500.00. He may receive the
payments subject to the following conditions: (1) that he was under rehabilitation treatment
during the offseason following the season of injury; and (2) that he failed the physical examination the club gives at the start of training camp. Id. art. X, §§ 1 & 2. It should be noted
that this benefit is given only once during a player's career and payments cease if he signs a
contract with a new team that year. A similar provision exists in the Baseball Agreement at
art. VIII (D) except that the player is paid his full salary, less any workmen's compensation
payments.
218. In the NBA for example, to qualify for the insurance benefits the player must be
permanently and totally disabled. See NBA Agreement, supra note 74, Exhibit B-1, Part 1.
219. For a full discussion of Worker's Compensation and its application to professional
athletes, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 193, at 1004-12.
220. See notes 152-76 and accompanying text, supra.
221. See Part II (C), supra.
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who have a good chance of recovering damages are those who are
injured by violent acts that occur out of the play." In this situation, the courts are not faced with the severe line-drawing
problems presented when the player is injured during play. The
majority of players, however, are injured during the course of
play.22 8 Therefore, those who may feel that they were injured by an
unnecessary act of violence have no practical means of judicial
recourse.
League management and the players association should adopt
new provisions in their collective bargaining agreement to provide
greater monetary and health benefits for players injured by acts of
violence. Management should increase the present disability benefits for these players and create a special fund for additional compensation. The amount of compensation the injured player receives
through this fund should be determined by the extent of his injury.
Therefore, a player permanently disabled will be more highly compensated than one who is not permanently injured. A committee
comprised of labor and management representatives should be established to manage the program. The committee will hear grievance claims and determine whether the circumstances surrounding
the player's injury make him eligible for additional compensation
under this plan."' The committee must also draft rules of procedure similar to those of the Joint Committee on Player Discipline,
and incorporate an appeals process into this program. Should a
player be dissatisfied with the ruling of the committee he should
have the opportunity to appeal to an objective third party. In
those situations where an appeal is to be made, the use of arbitration is recommended.
Should the leagues include this plan as part of their collective
bargaining agreement, the players must expressly waive any claims
they may have against another player and/or his team for injuries
arising out of the other player's conduct. The waiver is necessary
to avoid negating the purpose of the plan, which is to preclude the
use of the courts as a means of getting compensation for one's injuries. The players will benefit from this plan because they will avoid
the uncertainty and expense of a civil suit. Management will benefit because it will not be presented with the threat of a civil suit,
222. See note 179, supra.
223. See note 5 and accompanying text, supra.
224. This will not be a difficult task as the committee will merely have to defer to the
findings of the Joint Committee on Discipline.
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and will avoid the expense of defending the suit should one be
filed. Also, the sport's public image will no longer be adversely affected by the publicity associated with court actions. Finally, the
judicial system will benefit because it will no longer have to resolve
the problems of sports violence civil suits.

Conclusion
American society is concerned about the presence of violence in
professional sports. Critics have argued that self-regulation is not a
feasible means of control and that public law enforcement is necessary to eliminate violence in professional sports.
Public law enforcement cannot effectively deter violence in professional sports because violent conduct is, unfortunately, an accepted part of most sports. Criminal sanctions, therefore, cannot
effectively control such conduct because it is not perceived as criminal by the players and management. Civil sanctions serve little
deterrent purposes, and only players injured by violent acts out of
the play have a good chance to recover damages for their injury.
Self-regulation by the leagues is the most feasible means of controlling sports violence. The present internal disciplinary system,
however, must be abolished. The players must get involved in the
process of making rules and establishing proper player conduct
during the game for self-regulation to be effective in eliminating
professional sports violence. In addition, a sincere attempt must be
made by management to create a program of adequate compensation for players injured by acts of excessive violence.

